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This study explores what determines employers’ violations of the wage contracts of workers on
H-1B temporary work visas, which occur when firms pay those workers below the promised
prevailing or “market” wage. A theoretical framework is proposed that predicts more violations
during economic downturns, fewer violations when firms have more labor-market power, and
more violations by subcontractor firms. Empirical analysis is based on a firm-level matched
dataset of wage and hour violations and the firms that sponsor H-1Bs. Higher labor market
power, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is associated with fewer violations. Higher
unemployment rates and subcontractor firms are associated with more violations. The effects of
the unemployment rate and labor market power are amplified in subcontractor firms.
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1. Introduction
Employers sometimes pay workers less than what the law or a labor contract requires.
Such violations, while more the exception than the norm, occur with sufficient frequency to be of
concern to policymakers, the affected workers, and society in general. They have substantial
social welfare implications, shifting surplus from workers to employers and undermining the
wage floors imposed by policymakers. To the extent that such violations occur after the
employment contract is agreed to they come as an unpleasant surprise to workers, which
introduces uncertainty into wage contracts.
One defense against such exploitative employer behavior is labor mobility, the act of
leaving the current or potential employer to pursue other opportunities, often with another
employer who offers higher pay. Not all worker groups, however, have the same opportunities or
enjoy the same degree of labor mobility. For example, foreign-born “guest workers”, who arrive
in a destination country on temporary work visas with the intention to return to their origin
country after a period of employment, enjoy less labor mobility than domestic workers.1 These
workers may suffer even worse treatment at the hands of employers if their mobility is further
restricted for other reasons. In particular, guest workers are often caught in a secondary labor
market of subcontractors, staffing agencies, and other labor market intermediaries.2
This study explores the determinants of wage violations against the “highly-skilled” guest
workers (henceforth, H-1Bs) in the United States H-1B temporary visa program. Specifically, the
roles of economic conditions, market power in the labor market, and subcontractor status are
examined as determinants of wage violations.

1

This is most evident when examining guest workers who subsequently obtain permanent residency: quit rates
increase 4.6% the year after permanent residency is obtained (Hunt and Xie 2019). Some reasons why migrants have
limited mobility include discrimination, linguistic and cultural barriers, limited information about job opportunities,
and less developed social networks. This limited mobility gives employers greater market power over migrant than
over domestic workers. See Amior and Manning (2020) for further discussion.
2

In the U.S. H-1B visa program, labor market intermediaries are typically foreign-headquartered information
technology services firms whose recruitment and subcontracting of guest workers is associated with within-firm
increases in labor productivity. In contrast, “lead firms” are typically U.S.-based heavy users of the visa, including
universities and firms in specific industries whose guest worker sponsorship is associated with increased patenting
and investments in R&D (Norlander and Varma 2019).
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Economic conditions can be expected to influence employers’ tendency to commit wage
violations. Recessions limit workers’ mobility, given that labor demand is a derived demand and
that demand for firms’ products and services falls in recessions. Thus, wage violations should be
less (more) common in a tight (weak) labor market with low (high) unemployment. The degree
of market power in the labor market is a further consideration. Initial intuition might suggest a
parallel argument to the preceding one for economic conditions: wage violations should be more
common under monopsony than under perfect competition because labor mobility is greater
under perfect competition than under monopsony, which makes workers more exploitable under
monopsony. But that greater exploitability means that wages are already lower (even without
wage violations) than under perfect competition, and with so much of the surplus already being
extracted from workers, further wage cuts might be unprofitable. In the wake of an unexpected
negative shock, a perfectly competitive firm needs to cut wages (thereby triggering a violation)
just to survive, whereas a monopsonist need not. A monopsonist can potentially withstand the
negative shock without cutting wages, albeit at a reduced profit level. That insight, which will be
developed more fully in due course, is new.
The effects of economic conditions, labor market power, and the role of subcontractor
status on firm-level wage violations have not been addressed in the literature.3 This study is the
first with matched firm-level labor demand and violations data and is the first to model and test
how these determinants effect wage theft. Three questions are of interest. First, what is the effect
of economic conditions – specifically, shocks that reduce a worker’s marginal revenue product –
on wage violations? Second, what is the effect of labor market power on wage violations? Third,
why do subcontractor firms systematically commit more violations than other firms?
Addressing these questions requires clarifying how policymakers set wage floors and
where those floors lie relative to the equilibrium wages that would prevail in the absence of
3

Fine, Galvin, Round and Shepherd (2020) report that state-level increases in the unemployment rate during the
great recession were associated with increased wage and hour violations. Marinescu, Qiu, and Sojourner (2021) find
mixed evidence regarding the relationship between wage and hour violations and concentration: a negative
association in OLS estimates but a positive association in an instrumental variable analysis. Different samples and
contexts could account for these results. Although the role of subcontractor status as a determinant of wage
violations has not been addressed in the literature, there is evidence more generally that business organization affects
wage violations. For example, franchisees are more likely to commit violations than brand-owned chains (Ji and
Weil 2015).

2

institutional constraints on pay. Given that H-1Bs are highly skilled, the relevant wage floors
typically lie considerably above the floors set by federal and state minimum wage laws. For H1Bs, the relevant floor – which applies for a duration of multiple years – is the prevailing or
“market” wage within their occupation and geographic region.4 It is promised ex ante by the
employer, and the ex post breach of that “attestation” (or contract) is a violation of wage and
hour law. From a theoretical standpoint, this prevailing wage can be thought of as coinciding
with the aforementioned equilibrium wage. Theory predicts that this equilibrium wage (and,
therefore, the coinciding prevailing wage) varies by labor market structure, being lower under
monopsony than under perfect competition. More precisely, under monopsony, the sole
employer5 sets the wage equal to the worker’s reservation utility, whereas under perfect
competition the wage is bid up to a level that exceeds the worker’s reservation utility.
But if equilibrium wages and wage floors coincide, why would wage violations ever be
observed? Cutting the wage below its equilibrium level would be unprofitable (even abstracting
from administrative fines that are imposed if the employer is caught in a violation) due to costly
turnover; under monopsony, the worker would quit to take the reservation option, under perfect
competition the worker would quit to take a job with another employer, and in either case the
worker’s original employer would earn zero profit. One explanation for wage violations is that
an unanticipated, negative shock (a recession) occurs that is common to all firms in the market.
Whereas the prevailing wage stays fixed for multiple years, the equilibrium wage drops in the
wake of the negative shock. With the prevailing wage exceeding the new equilibrium wage, a
monopsonist can increase profit via a wage violation, as long as the expected administrative fine
imposed on the employer (if caught) is sufficiently low. Firms faced with a perfectly competitive

4

As observed in Manning (2020): “Prevailing wage provisions seek to ensure that migrants on work visas are paid
the going rate and do not undercut existing workers, but enforcement may be imperfect.”
5

Although there is only one employer in a pure monopsony, employers have a degree of monopsony power even in
labor markets with many employers, and that market power is used to lower wages (Manning 2003; Webber 2015;
Sokolova and Sørensen 2021). Labor market frictions and heterogeneous worker preferences can give rise to
imperfect competition.
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labor market have an even stronger imperative to engage in wage violations because post-shock
profit is negative, so wage violations are necessary just to keep the firm operational.6
This study presents a theoretical framework that formalizes the preceding ideas. The
main insight is that an increase in market power can make wage violations less likely to occur.
When the prevailing wage lies above the equilibrium wage, either because of the policymaker’s
initial mandate or because of an unanticipated negative shock that breaks the equality between
those two wage levels, a perfectly competitive firm must violate the prevailing wage just to stay
in business with non-negative profit, whereas the monopsonist will do so only if the expected
penalty from getting caught is sufficiently low. This insight is important because one’s initial
intuition might suggest exactly the opposite result – that wage violations should be more likely to
occur under monopsony.7 The theoretical framework can also explain the greater prevalence of
wage violations at subcontractor firms. Recall that under the monopsony market structure the
employer sets wage levels equal to the worker’s reservation utility. Reservation wages are
persistently lower for H-1Bs in subcontractor firms than in lead firms, as explained in section
3.2.3. The model shows that subcontractors that employ workers with systematically lower
reservation wages have greater incentives to commit wage theft in the presence of administrative
fines.8
Consistent with the theoretical framework, this study presents a novel empirical finding
that greater market power is associated with more employer compliance with prevailing wage
requirements. It is the first to examine the effect of labor-market concentration – or, more
generally, any aspect of labor-market competitiveness – on violations of U.S. wage and hour law

6

This suggests an alternative rationale for wage violations that does not involve an unexpected, negative shock. The
policymaker might initially set the prevailing wage at a level that exceeds (rather than equals) the equilibrium wage,
so that the initial situation matches the post-shock scenario just described.
7

After all, when there is only a single employer, workers’ labor mobility is limited in that they cannot go work for a
competing employer. In contrast, under perfect competition there is substantial mobility: an employer cannot cut the
worker’s pay without losing them to a competing employer. Thus, it might seem that workers should be easier to
“exploit” via wage violations under monopsony. This interpretation is provided in Marinescu, Qiu, and Sojourner
(2021). Complicating this interpretation, frictions in the labor market, and not concentration alone, also pose barriers
to mobility, and evidence suggests firms do not use all of their monopsony power (Gibbons et al. 2019).
8
In practice, an ongoing challenge for policymakers is the high prevalence of violations by subcontractors at
“fissured” workplaces, where subcontractors employ many of the workers who work for a lead firm (Weil 2018).

4

against guest workers. The second main result concerns the effect of economic conditions on
wage violations. Specifically, the unemployment rate (an indicator of a widespread negative
shock from a recession) is positively associated with wage violations. Third, subcontractors
commit more wage and hour violations, and the first two results are stronger in subcontractor
firms than in lead firms.
The analysis uses unusually comprehensive data that include: 1) firm-level measures of
wage and hour violations; 2) a census of firm-level labor demand to create measures of the extent
of labor market concentration; and 3) an indicator of whether the firm is a subcontractor. Even
though subcontractors represent only 7% of firms in the sample, they sponsor 27% of the H-1Bs.
The result that the unemployment rate is positively related to wage violations is amplified for
subcontractors, and the result that labor-market concentration is negatively related to wage
violations is driven entirely by subcontractors. Thus, a relatively small fraction of firms account
for the wage violations against H-1Bs in these data, and they are comprised heavily of
subcontractors.
This work relates to Marinescu, Qiu, and Sojourner (2021) and to a large literature on
monopsony that is reviewed in Manning (2020). The measure of market power that serves as an
independent variable is labor market concentration, specifically the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), as in Azar et al.(2020). Related prior research has studied employer concentration and
institutional barriers to job mobility as potential causes of wage exploitation of guest workers
(Naidu, Nyarko, and Wang 2016; Depew et al. 2017; Gibbons et al. 2019; Hunt and Xie 2019).
Of particular relevance is Gibbons et al. (2019), which explores why, in the context of guest
worker programs, firms with market power do not use it to pay workers less.
There is also a related literature on wage theft, which frequently involves violations of
wage and hour laws.9 Much of that literature focuses on enforcement of laws to protect workers
from wage theft (Ashenfelter and Smith 1979; Weil 2005; Bernhardt et al. 2009; Fine and
9

Wage theft, which is the most common cause of federal legal action by guest workers against their employers
(Gibbons et al. 2019), means failing to pay the worker the amount promised. The literature often treats the term as
synonymous with non-compliance with wage and hour law, but the concepts require distinction. Wage theft comes
as a surprise to workers, whereas non-compliance might not (for example, if a worker voluntarily enters a contract
with full knowledge of the noncompliant pay, then no promise or contract is broken). Wage theft can also occur
even in the absence of any wage and hour laws. Chapter 2 of DeVaro (2020) discusses wage theft as contract failure.

5

Gordon 2010; Bobo 2011; Weil 2012; Bernhardt, Spiller, and Theodore 2013; DeVaro 2014;
Gleeson 2016; Borjas and Cassidy 2019). A number of studies documented the prevalence (and
under-reporting) of wage theft, examined franchising and other “fissured” employment
structures, and highlighted a need for industry-targeted, proactive and strategic investigation, as
opposed to a passive approach based on responding to complaints (Weil 2005, 2009, 2012; Weil
and Pyles 2005; Bernhardt et al. 2008; Bobo 2011; Bernhardt, Spiller, and Theodore 2013; Ji and
Weil 2015).
2. Institutional Background: The H-1B Guest Worker Program
A stated goal of the H-1B program is to address the global competitiveness challenge of
American companies facing “shortages in particular fields” (Hatch 2000).10 The notion of a labor
shortage suggests a highly competitive labor market in which jobseekers enjoy many options.
Typically, a highly competitive labor market protects workers from maltreatment by employers
(low wages, or wage theft), because workers have many options for alternative employers and
can always quit to work elsewhere.11 Contrary to the program’s goal, evidence raises doubts
about whether employers are seeking guest workers exclusively in the most competitive labor
markets.12
The H-1B program imposes regulations on both employer and worker behavior, some of
which promote and some of which limit labor mobility and the degree of labor market

10

A large literature documents the contributions of H-1Bs to national competitiveness through innovation and
productivity. The 2015 special issue on “US High-Skilled Immigration in the Global Economy” in the Journal of
Labor Economics features several articles concerning H-1Bs (See, for example, Peri, Shih, and Sparber 2015; Bound
et al. 2015; Hunt 2015; Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln 2015) and is a gateway into the literature.
11

The notion that H-1B labor markets are highly competitive and characterized by labor shortages is not universally
accepted. Cappelli (2015) argued that there is “little merit” to the claims of labor shortages that are used to justify
guest worker programs. Citing a lack of compelling evidence of skill shortages requiring H-1B workers, Abraham
(2015) recommended: a) removing barriers that make it difficult for guest workers to quit, and b) requiring
employers to make efforts to recruit U.S. workers prior to hiring guest workers.
12

The evidence suggests that employers have sought foreign-born workers in regions where unemployment is higher
under the permanent labor certification program (“PERM”) for green card applicants (Rissing and Castilla 2016).
Firm-level evidence also suggests that H-1Bs may crowd out domestic workers (Doran, Gelber, and Isen 2014) and
that firms which are more dependent upon H-1Bs are more likely to pursue cost-reduction (or labor arbitrage)
strategies (Norlander and Varma 2019).

6

competition. Only workers in occupations requiring “highly specialized knowledge,” such as
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) occupations, are eligible for visas.
Such workers are presumably in high demand, suggesting high labor mobility. At the same time,
the H-1B rules limit workers’ mobility, because the visa (and legal status within the U.S.) is lost
when an employment separation occurs, unless the worker quickly finds a new job with another
employer who sponsors H-1Bs. With an initial three-year visa that can be renewed once, many
guest workers hope to find an employer that will sponsor them for permanent resident status. In a
tight labor market with low unemployment rates, H-1Bs may be able to find higher-paying jobs,
but in a weak labor market, they are less likely to quit and are more likely to be sent back to their
home countries (Depew, Norlander, and Sorensen 2017).
Employers are required to clear certain “labor market tests” that are intended to ensure
that guest workers are not paid less than native workers in the relevant labor market (Griffith
2009). For H-1Bs, employers must attest in a “Labor Condition Application” (LCA) that they
will: 1) pay the higher of the prevailing wage in the local labor market within a region and
occupation,13 and the actual wage of workers in the same occupation, 2) provide the same
benefits and working conditions to guest workers as native workers, and 3) not use guest workers
to replace native workers who have been laid off or are involved in a labor dispute with their
employer. Further, an employer with more than 15% of their U.S. workforce comprised of H-1Bs
is required to pay the H-1B worker the higher of $60,000 per year in wages or the previously
described required wage, or clear additional labor market tests related to non-displacement,
recruitment, and hiring of U.S. workers. Failure to pay at least the amount on the LCA is a wage
violation.14 An employer’s filing of an LCA does not imply that a migrant worker is ultimately
13

Employers are responsible for choosing the appropriate prevailing wage for each workplace by selecting the
relevant occupation and skill level in a wage survey, most often the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational
Employment Survey. The wage floors are considerably higher than those in other labor markets, either domestically
or within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries (Dube 2014).
14

Enforcement for wage violations against H-1Bs is handled by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the U.S.
Department of Labor. The WHD’s authority and responsibility derive from the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
(MSPA), and from regulations defined by the U.S. Department of Labor. For H-1Bs, the WHD’s enforcement role is
passive in that it can only respond to complaints and cannot proactively target specific firms or industries for
investigation. The WHD is required to investigate each H-1B complaint, issue a formal determination, and (if the
complaint is corroborated) require the payment of back wages. See the Appendix for further details.
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hired at the stipulated wage (or at all). It is merely a documented statement of an employer’s
intent to recruit a guest worker in a certain location and at the wage required for that type of
worker in that geographic region.15
3. Theoretical Framework
This section provides a simple theoretical framework for understanding the study’s main
empirical results. The goal is to illustrate an employer’s propensity to violate prevailing wage
laws under the two polar extreme labor market structures (monopsony and perfect competition)
in the wake of negative shocks, and how this differs between lead firms and subcontractors.
Consider a two-period setup with no discounting. There is a single potential worker with perperiod reservation utility, U, where U > 0. The analysis is developed separately under the two
market structures. A single employer is assumed in the case of monopsony and N identical
employers (engaged in Bertrand-style wage competition) in the case of perfect competition. All
employers are assumed to maximize expected profit.
At the start of period 1, employers attempt to hire the worker by making a per-period
wage offer of WO, where WO > 0, anticipating that in each period of employment the worker will
generate revenue of R, where R > U. Wages are to be paid to the worker at the end of each period
of employment, as payment for the work that was done during that period. In the middle of
period 1, an unexpected negative shock (a recession) hits and lasts through the end of period 2.
The event is unforeseen by both the worker and the employers and affects all employers. It
reduces per-period revenue from R to (1 – d)R, where 0 < d < d*, with d* defined later in the
analysis. The employer must then decide whether to pay the worker as promised, cut the
worker’s wage, or fire the worker and shut down production. Let W denote the wage that is
actually paid to the worker at the end of each period, where W ≤ WO.

15

The effective minimum wage imposed on H-1Bs prevents employers from (legally) paying them considerably
less than native workers. Absent the regulation, employers may be tempted to do so given H-1Bs’ restricted labor
mobility. H-1Bs’ market wage, therefore, would be expected to lie below that of equally able native workers, absent
the regulation. The wage floor also diminishes employers’ appetite for hiring guest workers instead of native
workers, because (when enforced) it is impossible to legally hire guest workers “on the cheap.”

8

The preceding setup is analyzed in section 3.1 (first for monopsony and then for perfect
competition) for the benchmark case in which there are no institutional constraints on pay. That
analysis is then repeated in section 3.2 for the more interesting case in which there are
institutional constraints on pay, specifically prevailing wage laws and penalties that employers
incur if they are caught violating those laws. The benchmark analysis in section 3.1 highlights
some basic intuition about employer behavior that remains true in the regulated environment of
interest and that drives outcomes in that environment.
That basic intuition is simple but may appear counterintuitive at first glance. The question
at hand is whether monopsonists or perfectly competitive firms are more likely to engage in
violations in the event of a negative shock. Common intuition suggests that a monopsonist, as the
sole employer of labor, is in the best position to “exploit” the worker by cutting wages, whereas
competitive employers are constrained in their ability to lower wages because of the worker’s
threat to quit and work for a competing employer. But it is precisely the monopsonist’s
“exploitation” of the worker – paying the worker low wages – that prevents the monopsonist
from engaging in wage theft in the event of an unexpected decrease in the worker’s marginal
revenue product. If the worker’s pay is already so low that the worker is nearly indifferent
between working and pursuing the reservation option, then any further cuts will induce the
worker to quit. In contrast, in a competitive environment the worker’s wage is bid up to a level
higher than the reservation utility. This creates a buffer that allows the employer to cut wages, if
necessary, without inducing the worker to quit to take the reservation option, as long as the
negative shock is of limited magnitude and common to other employers in the labor market.
3.1. Benchmark Case: No Institutional Constraints on Pay
!

In the benchmark case, assume that d* = 1 − " , which ensures that d is small enough so
that the post-shock surplus (whether accruing to the monopsonist as profit or to the worker in the
case of perfect competition) remains positive.
3.1.1. Monopsony

9

As the sole buyer of labor, the monopsonist will offer a wage of WO = U, which leaves
the worker with zero surplus. The monopsonist anticipates reaping the entire surplus of R – U as
profit in each period. In fact what happens is that this per-period surplus is unexpectedly reduced
to (1 – d)R – U, which is still positive because of the assumed upper bound on d. In the wake of
the unexpected negative shock, the monopsonist does not fire the worker (or cut their wage)
because doing so would yield a period-2 profit of zero.
3.1.2. Competitive Labor Market
Bertrand wage competition implies that the worker is hired by one of the N firms at a perperiod wage of WO = R, which leaves all firms with per-period profit of zero and the worker with
the entire anticipated per-period surplus of R – U, which accrued to the monopsonist as
anticipated profit in section 3.1.1. In the wake of the unexpected negative shock, the worker’s
employer would suffer a per-period loss of -dR by honoring the wage contract, which would
require the firm to shut down. To avoid this loss, the employer decreases the wage from WO to
W = (1 – d)R, ensuring a per-period profit of zero for all firms. The worker’s per-period surplus
shrinks from R – U to (1 – d)R – U, which is positive, so the worker does not quit.
3.2. Prevailing Wage Regulations
The benchmark case shows that an unexpected negative shock induces a wage cut when
the labor market is competitive but not when it is monopsonistic. This greater impulse to cut
wages in the competitive case leads to a greater incidence of wage violations in an environment
with prevailing wage regulations, as is now shown. Suppose that employers are legally obligated
to pay (at least) the prevailing wage. Employers who fail to do so are caught with probability p at
the end of period 2 and must pay “back wages” for both periods, plus a fine in the amount of k,
where k > 0 and p ∊ (0,1].
The prevailing wages correspond to the “market wages” that applied before the
unexpected negative shock, and they differ between the two market structures. Call these
prevailing wage levels Wm for monopsony and Wc for perfect competition. Henceforth, assume

10

that d* = 1 −

#!
"

, which ensures that d is small enough so that the post-shock monopsony profit

remains positive.
Employers choose two wage levels in the model: an offered wage, WO, that the worker is
promised when hired, and a wage that is actually paid, W. Given that WO ≥ W, three possible
scenarios arise concerning compliance with prevailing wage law: 1) both WO and W are in
violation, 2) WO is compliant but W is in violation, 3) both WO and W are compliant.
3.2.1. Monopsony
The prevailing wage, Wm, that the government imposes in monopsony markets lies in the
range U ≤ Wm ≤ R.16 Only two possible wage offers make sense for the monopsonist (WO = Wm
or WO = U). An offer of WO = Wm is legal and avoids the risk of paying a fine, but it also
sacrifices some profit that is converted to worker surplus. At a wage offer of WO = Wm the
monopsonist anticipates receiving per-period profit of R – Wm, and the worker anticipates getting
Wm – U, where the sum of these two parts equals the total anticipated surplus of R – U from the
benchmark case.17 Which of the two wage offers (U or Wm) the monopsonist makes hinges on
how the benefits of wage theft (in the form of increased profit) compare to the expected cost of
the fine. More precisely, the monopsonist offers WO = U when the following condition holds:
2(R – U)(1 – p) + 2(R – Wm)p – pk > 2(R – Wm), which simplifies to
k < k*, where & ∗ =

%(# ! '!)()'*)
*

. Thus, if the fine is sufficiently low, the monopsonist violates

the prevailing wage law by offering a wage of WO = U. If the preceding condition fails, the
monopsonist remains in compliance with a wage offer of WO = Wm.
Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the monopsonist’s wage-setting choices visually, assuming
R = 10, U = 5, and Wm = 8. The solid black curve graphs k* as a function of p. For values of (p,k)
that lie along that curve, the monopsonist is indifferent between compliance and non-compliance.
For values of (p,k) that lie above (below) that curve, the monopsonist chooses compliance (non-

16

A monopsonist would never find it desirable to offer a wage below U, which would cause the worker to quit.

17
Wage offers lying between U and Wm are not sensible, as they subject the monopsonist to the same expected
penalty costs while ceding more of the surplus to the worker. If the monopsonist is going to risk getting caught and
penalized, it might as well reduce the wage all the way down to U as in the benchmark case.
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compliance). In the compliance region and along the k* curve that bounds it, profit is 4 for all
values of (p,k), because those parameters are relevant only in the non-compliance regime. In the
non-compliance region, expected profit is a function of both p and k and is decreasing in both
parameters, with the highest expected profit occurring in the neighborhood of the origin. As p ⟶
0 and k ⟶ 0, expected profit approaches 10 from below.
When the negative shock hits, regardless of whether the initial wage offer was WO = U or
WO = Wm, the monopsonist would not fire the worker, because doing so would reduce profit to
zero. Similarly, the monopsonist would not cut the wage, because cutting the wage below U
when WO = U would cause the worker to quit (yielding zero profit) whereas cutting the wage
below Wm when WO = Wm would lead to a profit reduction. The profit reduction in the latter case
would correspond to a wage cut from WO to U, because a larger wage cut would induce a quit
(and therefore zero profit) whereas a smaller cut would be unprofitable for the reason given in
the preceding footnote. If the offered wage is WO = Wm, the reason the monopsonist does not find
it optimal to cut the wage to W = U after the shock hits is the same reason the monopsonist does
not find it optimal to offer a wage of WO = U from the start (k ≥ k*). Thus, in the wake of the
negative shock, the monopsonist continues to employ the worker and to pay the initially
promised wage, while suffering a drop in per-period profit from R – WO to (1 – d)R – WO.
The bottom line is that the monopsonist violates the prevailing wage law if k < k* and
complies with it otherwise. Inspection of the critical threshold & ∗ =

%(# ! '!)()'*)
*

provides

further intuition. When the prevailing wage, Wm, increases, compliance becomes costlier to the
monopsonist, so k* increases, which expands the range of values of the fine, k, for which noncompliance is desirable. Similarly, when the worker’s reservation utility, U, decreases, the
monopsonist finds it even more tempting to “exploit” the worker via non-compliance, because
considerable profit can be made by pushing the wage down as low as U. Thus, k* increases,
which expands the range of values of the fine, k, for which non-compliance is desirable. If p = 1,
the monopsonist is certain to get caught in the event of a violation. Even if the fine is negligible
in that case, it is still unprofitable to engage in wage theft because of the requirement to pay
“back wages” in both periods, meaning that the monopsonist is guaranteed to pay a fine with
nothing to show for it. In this case, k* = 0, so there are no values of k for which wage theft
12

occurs. If p ⟶ 0, it is nearly impossible for the monopsonist to get caught in a violation, which
makes wage theft appealing given that it shifts surplus from the worker to the monopsonist. In
that case, k* ⟶ ∞, so that any value of k is consistent with wage theft being profitable.

3.2.2. Competitive Labor Market
Assume that the government sets the prevailing wage in competitive markets, Wc, to R,
which is the market value of the (pre-shock) competitive wage.18 Bertrand wage competition
implies that the worker is hired at a wage of WO = Wc = R. Now the worker gets the entire
surplus of R – U, because all employers make zero profit. When the negative shock hits, the
employers’ per-period profit from hiring the worker drops to -dR, which is a loss. The shock is
assumed to affect all employers symmetrically.19 For any d > 0, the employer must either fire the
worker and shut down or cut the worker’s wage to W = W*, where U ≤ W* ≤ (1-d)R < R, and
profit is zero.20 That wage level is defined as follows:
* ∗ = (1 − ,). −

*(+,%-")
%()'*)

.

This expression reveals that W* lies below R for two reasons. The first is the productivity
drop due to the shock (W* ≤ (1-d)R, the first term on the right-hand side of W*, which coincides
with the value of W in the benchmark case of section 3.1.2) and the second is the possibility of
getting caught and fined for violating the prevailing wage law (the second term on the right-hand
-*"

side of W*, which vanishes when p ⟶ 0 and reduces to )'* as k⟶ 0). Also note that W*
decreases when either or both of p and k increase, because those two parameters determine the
expected cost of getting caught. The bottom line is that wage theft or firm exit from the labor

18
Values of Wc above R would never be respected due to negative profit. Values of Wc below R would not be
relevant in the (pre-shock) equilibrium, because Bertrand competition ensures that no employer will offer a wage
below WO = R. But such values may become relevant, post-shock, if wage cuts are deep enough so that W < Wc.
19

Strictly speaking, all that is required is that the negative shock affect all but one of the employers in the labor
market symmetrically. If one employer remains unaffected, that firm will hire the worker and make positive profit,
but the offered wage will be the same as that offered by all of the other (affected) employers who make zero profit.
20

A deeper cut would imply positive profit, which would be bid away in Bertrand competition.
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market always occurs in the competitive case,21 whereas in the monopsonistic case it happens
only when the administrative fine, k, is sufficiently low.
3.2.3. Competition, Dual Labor Markets, and Subcontractors
The model can also provide insight into the operation of the labor market for H-1Bs in
subcontractor firms,22 as opposed to the “lead firms” that directly hire H-1Bs. In the H-1B
program, many lead firms and universities recruit the “best and brightest,” and these workers go
on to patent and start firms at higher rates than native workers (Kerr and Lincoln 2010). In
contrast, as critics of the H-1B program have observed in Congressional testimony and
elsewhere, subcontractor H-1Bs are likely to be paid less than lead firm H-1Bs, have less stable
employment in the U.S., are more likely to view a non-U.S. country as their permanent home,
have fewer advanced degrees, fewer degrees from U.S. universities, and are less likely to be
sponsored by their subcontractor employers to obtain green cards or become U.S. citizens (see
Hira [2016, 2017], for discussion). Subcontractor H-1Bs face barriers to finding work at lead
firms in the U.S., and subcontractor firms therefore systematically hire workers with lower
reservation wages, a consequence of these H-1B workers’ limited mobility.
Given that subcontractor and lead firm H-1Bs arguably work in distinct labor markets,
the theory of dual labor markets offers a conceptual framework for understanding their
differences. Dual labor market theory distinguishes between primary and secondary labor
markets: workers in the primary market tend to have higher pay, more stable employment, higher
skills, face less discrimination, and do not work for subcontractors or temporary employers
(Doeringer and Piore 1971).23 Workers in the secondary labor market face difficulty accessing
the primary labor market and have lower reservation wages than primary workers because
21

This conclusion weakens somewhat if the prevailing wage is set to some value below R (Wc < R). Then it is no
longer the case that wage theft always occurs under perfect competition. To see why, suppose that d is small so that
only a small revenue loss is induced by the shock. Then a very small cut in the wage (to a value below the
competitive wage of R but still above the prevailing wage of Wc) may be sufficient to ensure zero profit without
triggering a violation.
22
Fifteen of the 20 largest users of H-1Bs are subcontractors and offshore outsourcing firms that place their
temporary H-1B workers at another company’s worksites, often for a short duration, to facilitate the offshoring of
programming work (Hira 2016).
23

Subcontracting is one of several instruments available to employers to adjust to changes in the external labor
market: “primary employers, through devices such as subcontracting the temporary employment, can convert
primary employment into secondary employment” (ibid, p. 272).
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mobility between markets is restricted to a certain degree: “[s]econdary workers cannot simply
‘join’ the primary labor market on an equal footing with those already there” (McDonald and
Solow 1985, p. 1116). When unemployment is high, workers in the secondary market are
especially unable to transition as they are at the end of the “queue” for hiring into the primary
market (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
Dual labor market theory, as it applies to lead firms and subcontractors, can be
understood in the context of the theoretical model via differences in workers’ reservation wages
between the two markets. Let Us and Ul denote the reservation wages in the subcontractor
( secondary) and lead firm (primary) markets, where Us < Ul is implied by the preceding
discussion. The threshold k*, as defined in section 3.2.1, is therefore greater in the subcontractor
market than in the lead firm market (&.∗ < &/∗ ). Thus, non-compliance is more prevalent in the
subcontractor marker than in the lead firm market. Subcontractor employers, who systematically
hire H-1Bs with lower reservation wages, face greater incentives to commit wage theft. Panel B
of Figure 1 illustrates this graphically. The solid curve reproduces the k*(p) from Panel A
(rescaling the vertical axis), though it now pertains to lead firms, for which Ul = 5. The dashed
curve graphs the k*(p) for subcontractor firms, for which Us = 3. The k*(p) curve for lead firms
shifts to the northeast for subcontractors, thereby expanding the region of non-compliance.
4. Data and Methods
Two sources of micro-data (henceforth, the “demand-side data” and the “violations data”)
are used to analyze how economic conditions and labor market power affect violations. The
“demand-side data” provide information on firms’ labor demand for H-1Bs in a specific
establishment from 2000 to 2017.24 The “violations data” provide firm-establishment
information on the count of wage and hour violations a firm has in a labor market in years 2000
to 2017, and the sum of the amount of wages owed to H-1Bs in a firm and labor market.25
24

The Education and Training Administration’s (ETA) Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC), requires
employers to submit an LCA, which registers the firm’s desire to hire one or more H-1Bs in a particular location and
occupation at a particular wage. The LCA data are available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor.
25
These data, which were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of Labor, are
from the Wage and Hour Investigative Support and Reporting Database (WHISARD) and are maintained by the
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor. As noted by Kerwin and McCabe (2011), state
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The demand-side data, the violations data and unemployment rates are combined into a
matched dataset constructed at the firm, commuting zone, occupation, and year level.26 Section
4.1 describes each variable in the analysis. Section 4.2 summarizes descriptive statistics of the
dataset. Section 4.3 presents statistical models used to analyze the data.
4.1. Measures
4.1.1. Dependent Variables
Number of Wage and Hour Violations
The main dependent variable is Violations, a count variable measuring the number of
wage and hour violations against H-1Bs that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division (WHD) determined were substantiated. This information is contained in the violations
data, including the specific law (and section of the law) that was found to have been violated.
Only the H-1B violations are retained. Whereas the demand-side data include yearly information
on the occupations of H-1Bs sponsored, and information on the industry of a firm for several
years, the violations data include information on the industry of every firm and no information
on the occupation of H-1Bs. Industries are at the 2-digit, or sector, NAICS level. Thus, for years
in which both the industry and the 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code are
available, a matrix is constructed of the proportion of each occupation within an industry.
Violations are then assigned proportionally to occupations according to the percentage of an
occupation in an industry. For each violation recorded in the violations data, there is a start and
end date. The matched dataset reflects that a violation occurred within a particular firm, year,
occupation and commuting zone.
As seen in Table 1, violations are rare, with an average of 2.293 violations in the
conditional fixed effects negative binomial model sample and 0.044 violations in the full sample.
wage and hour enforcement resources in the U.S. rival federal resources, so while a clear picture of wage violations
for most workers using data from the federal Wage and Hour Division is unavailable, the H-1B program is an
exception, given that all H-1B violations fall under federal purview. See Appendix B.
26

The demand-side data set is constructed at the firm level but otherwise follows the process described in Gibbons
et al. (2019). Matching involves cleaning firm names using algorithms that “stem” words that can have different
spellings, such as “Incorporated” and “Inc.” In addition to the firm matching procedure described in Wasi and
Flaaen (2015), the authors hand-coded the largest 90 percent of employers to ensure continuity of naming
conventions.
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Both panels reveal that Violations is an over-dispersed count variable (has a much larger
variance than mean). In addition to negative binomial models that use Violations as the
dependent variable, auxiliary OLS regressions are reported in the Appendix with transformations
using 012 31 + 1000 6

012.34125/",$,%&,'
6)7/",$,%&,'

78 as the dependent variable.27

Amount of Wage Theft
An alternative dependent variable that captures the dollar amount of wage theft is the
738+ #3:;/",$,%&,'

back wages a firm pays: 012 31 + 1000 6

6)7/",$,%&,'

78. Back wages are computed based

upon the amount of money that an employee was underpaid. Given the requirements for H-1Bs,
an employer who is assessed back wages must have paid workers less than the promised or
prevailing wage. Therefore, this is a direct measure of the substantiated amount of wage theft
suffered by H-1Bs. As seen in Table 1, average back wages are $8690 in the conditional firm
fixed effects sample and $173 in the full sample.
4.1.2. Independent Variables
Economic Conditions and Labor Market Concentration
Economic conditions are measured by the unemployment rate, UR, the percentage of
unemployed workers in a commuting zone and year, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Local Area Unemployment (LAU) rate statistics. LAU statistics are available at the county-year
level and are aggregated to the commuting zone-year and weighted by the size of the labor force
in each county within a commuting zone. The unemployment rate is a percent, and as seen in
Table 1, averages 6.22% in the conditional fixed effects negative binomial model sample and
6.02% in the full sample for the study period. To enable easier interpretation, the variable UR is
standardized in the regressions.

27

Given that a matrix is used to proportionally assign violations to occupations, observations of Violations are
rounded to the nearest integer in the negative binomial model that requires count data for the dependent variable. In
the OLS regressions, the Violations variable is not rounded to the nearest integer.
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Labor market concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
which is constructed using annual disclosure data from the “demand-side” data filed by
employers in the LCAs.28 Manning (2020) highlighted that studies must draw a boundary – using
either industry or occupation – around a discrete labor market. In the present study, the demandside dataset is aggregated to the labor market level, defining labor markets by year, geographic
region (commuting zone), and 2-digit SOC occupation code. For commuting zones, 1990
Census-defined geographical regions are used and are intended to describe local labor markets.
The formula for HHI is:
5
%
::;2,8=,4 = < =>,2,8=,4
1?)
%
where =>,2,8=,4
is the share of firm f’s employment in occupation o and commuting zone cz in year

t. As described in section 5.5, the results are insensitive to defining the market with the
alternative industry, commuting zone, and year level. To reduce noise, the three-year average
HHI within a labor market is used. As noted in Manning (2020), a limitation of using HHI as a
measure of labor market competitiveness is that even firms with many competitors may still
enjoy market power due to frictions in the labor market that stand apart from concentration (such
as imperfect information about available job opportunities). Mitigating this concern is the
documented evidence of a positive correlation between concentration and lower wages.29 HHI is
scaled between 0 and 1, equaling 1 in a pure monopsony and 0 in an unconcentrated or
competitive market. As seen in Table 1, the average HHI is 0.149 in the conditional fixed effects
negative binomial model sample and 0.142 in the full sample.
Subcontractor Status
In 2019, the Department of Labor’s LCA data included information on whether a firm’s
H-1Bs were working directly for the firm that sponsored the worker (the “lead firm”), or for a
28

These data include the number of H-1Bs sought, the occupation of the workers, and the geographic location.

29

A rapidly growing literature suggests that diminished competition has a role in suppressing workers’ wages (Azar
et al. 2018; Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim 2020; Rinz, 2018; Hershbein and Macaluso 2018; Gibbons et al. 2019;
Qiu and Sojourner 2019). Qiu and Sojourner (2019) studied how labor market concentration affects fringe benefits
as well as wage levels, although most research that has focused on the effects of concentration has used wages as the
dependent variable.
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secondary entity (the “subcontractor”). The names of both firms were reported. The data are
coded as “Y = Workers will be placed with a secondary entity”; “N = Workers will not be placed
with a secondary entity.” A time invariant, firm-specific binary variable, SUB, is constructed
equaling 1 if “Y” and 0 if “N.” As seen in Table 1, 59.7% of firms are subcontractors in the
conditional fixed effects negative binomial model sample, and 7.1% of firms are subcontractors
in the full sample (when weighted by the number of H-1Bs employed, subcontractors employ
27.6% of H-1Bs).
4.1.3. Control Variables
Control variables include demand-side data on the log of the number of H-1Bs for which
LCAs were obtained within the labor market, 012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @, and binary indicators for year,
occupation, commuting zone, and firm. The log of the number of H-1Bs controls for the
population at risk of experiencing a violation. Year indicators control for variation over time in
H-1B policy, WHD enforcement strategy or resources, and potential selection issues arising in
the WHISARD database due to investigations in progress not yet being included. Occupation
indicators control for variation in the nature of work and the potential that H-1Bs employed in
particular occupations may be at greater or lesser risk of wage theft.
Commuting zone indicators control for differences between geographical regions that
might expose workers to a greater or lesser risk of wage theft, or differences in regional reporting
of wage-theft incidents. The effect of concentration could reflect the existence of different types
of firms in different labor markets. Several statistical models described in section 4.3 include
firm-level fixed effects that control for time-invariant, unobserved, firm-level characteristics.
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. The estimation
sample, and therefore the sample size, differs considerably when the conditional fixed effects
negative binomial model is estimated (see 4.3.1). That model drops many observations that lack
within-firm variation in the outcome variable, leading to a sample that is different from the full
sample: with more violations, higher back wages, and more subcontractors. Descriptive statistics
are presented separately for the two samples, with the smaller sample (for models that include
19

conditional firm fixed effects) in Panel 1a and the full sample in Panel 1b. As can be seen from
Panel 1b, when looking at the full universe of firms that sponsor guest workers on visas,
recorded wage and hour violations are a very sparse outcome, with only 0.004% of cells
(approximately 5,600) at the firm, year, commuting zone, and occupation level having any
violations.
Figure 2 (Figure 3) displays a bar graph of the average HHI (unemployment rate) for
subcontractor and lead firms at “zero,” “fewer than 5,” and “6 or more” violations recorded.
Figures 2 and 3 visually illustrate the main results of this study and the predictions of the model
that: 1) wage and hour violations increase when the unemployment rate is higher, as modeled in
section 3; 2) wage and hour violations are higher in competitive markets than in monopsony
markets, as modeled in section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2; and 3) both effects are concentrated in
subcontractor firms, as modeled in section 3.2.3.
Section 2 describes an effective $60,000 wage floor for H-1B-dependent (largely
subcontractor) firms that was put in effect after 2005. As a prima facie test of the validity of the
theoretical model in the H-1B context, Figure 4 presents a kernel density estimate of the post2005 wage distributions for subcontractor and lead firms weighted by the number of H-1Bs. The
figure demonstrates that subcontractors’ wages are bunched near the applicable wage floor,
whereas lead firms’ wages show no such pattern.
4.3. Statistical Models
The five statistical models estimated in this study are described in the following five
subsections. Models 1 and 2 are negative binomial count models because the dependent variable
is an over-dispersed count of the number of violations. Models 3 and 4 are ordinary least squares
(OLS) linear probability models and use 012 31 + 1000 6
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78 as the dependent

variable. Model 5 is a probit model that summarizes the probabilities that a firm ever exits the
labor market or commits a violation, and the probability that a firm exits or violates in a given
year. The treatment of fixed effects in negative binomial models requires comment. As discussed
in Cameron and Trivedi (2013), the fixed-effects model controls for firm-specific distributions of
the dispersion parameter but is not a “true” fixed-effects model. The reason is that in a true fixed20

effects model the coefficients of time-invariant regressors are not identified, whereas in the
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model they are.30 Henceforth, let t, o, cz, and f index
years, occupations, commuting zones, and firms, respectively.
4.3.1. Model 1
To estimate the effect of economic conditions and labor market power on wage and hour
violations, the following conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression model for panel
data is estimated (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984, Cameron and Trivedi 2013):31
(4)

A[CD10EFD1G=>,2,8=,4 ] =
IJK (L) M.8=,4 + L% ::;2,8=,4 + N N012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @ + O> + P2 + Q4 )

where CD10EFD1G=>,2,8=,4 is the count of wage and hour violations within firm f employing
workers in occupation o and commuting zone cz in year t. The conditional fixed effect, O> ,
applies only to the distribution of the dispersion parameter, so that all observations in the same
firm have the same dispersion.32
The parameters of interest are L) and L% . When exponentiated, they reflect incidence rate
ratios, meaning that exp(β1) measures the effect of an increase of one standard deviation (above
the average) in the unemployment rate in a commuting zone in a given year, whereas exp(β2)
measures the effect of moving from a competitive market (HHI = 0) to a monopsony market
(HHI = 1). The statistics 100exp(β1) and 100exp(β2) reflect percentage changes in the expected
count of the dependent variable when the appropriate independent variable increases by one.

30

However, true fixed effects can be incorporated into the model via a full set of unit-specific indicator variables.

This statistical model has the following general form: ![#() ] = &'((*( + ,'() ), where the dependent variable #()
varies over units i and time t, '() refers to a single explanatory variable, , is the parameter of interest to be
estimated, and the conditional fixed effect is *( . The *( term affects the mean and variance directly, while '() affects
the variance only through the mean (Allison and Waterman, 2002). The conditional fixed effect, *( , applies only to
the distribution of the dispersion parameter and not the ,'() term. In the more general case of more than one
covariate, ,'() could be redefined in vector notation.
31

32

The model is estimated using STATA’s xtnbreg command. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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The controls P2 and Q4 are a full set of occupation-and-year-specific indicator variables,
whereas N012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @ measures population exposure and reflects the log of the number of
H-1Bs for which a firm obtained LCAs. Estimation results from negative binomial regressions
for Model 1 are reported in Table 2 of section 5.1. Results that treat O> as a fixed effect are
reported in Panel A, and those that treat it as a random effect are reported in Panel B.
4.3.2. Model 2
Model 2 is the following negative binomial regression:33
(2)

A[CD10EFD1G=>,2,8=,4 ] = exp (L) M.8=,4 + L% ::;2,8=,4 + L@ VM?> +

LA >VM?> × ::;2,8=,4 @ + LB >VM?> × M.8=,4 @ + P2 + Q4 + X8= + N012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @)
Model 2 incorporates additional independent variables that were absent from Model 1, in
particular SUBf and its interactions with HHIo,cz,t and URcz,t. Control variables match those in
Model 1, except for the inclusion of commuting zone effects, X8= , and the exclusion of firm
effects, O> .
Estimation results from Model 2 are reported in Table 3 of section 5.2. To interpret those
results, note that the baseline odds are for a lead (non-subcontractor) firm in a competitive labor
market with average unemployment, holding other controls constant. The change in the odds for
a one-standard-deviation-above-average unemployment rate compared to the baseline is given by
IJK(L) ). The change in the odds for a monopsony market compared to the baseline is given by
IJK(L% ). The change in the odds for a subcontractor compared to the baseline is given by
IJK(L@ ).
Multiplying the exponentiated coefficients of the main effects and their interaction terms
yields the change in the odds when the main effects and their interaction are equal to 1 compared

33

The STATA program nbreg is used to estimate the model. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Analysis categories
are constructed following the procedure described in Silva and Tenreyro (2011), which drops indicator variables for
specific occupations and commuting zones to create larger indicators when the smaller categories perfectly predict
the outcome variable.

22

to the baseline, which offers a more meaningful interpretation than marginal effects that rely on
discrete values.34 Thus, the change in the odds for a subcontractor in a monopsony labor market
at average unemployment compared to the baseline lead firm in a competitive market with
average unemployment is given by IJK(L% )IJK(L@ )IJK(LA ), or IJK(L% + L@ + LA ), multiplying
the change in the odds for a monopsony, IJK(L% ), by the change in the odds for a
subcontractor, IJK(L@ ), by the change in the odds of subcontractor between monopsony and
competitive labor markets, IJK(LA ).
The change in the odds for a subcontractor in a competitive labor market with a onestandard-deviation-above-average unemployment rate compared to the baseline lead firm in a
competitive market with average unemployment is given by IJK(L) )IJK(L@ )IJK(LB ), or
IJK(L) + L@ + LB ), multiplying the change in the odds for a one-standard-deviation-aboveaverage unemployment rate, IJK(L) ), by the change in the odds for a subcontractor, IJK(L@ ), by
the change in the odds of subcontractor between a one-standard-deviation-above-average
unemployment and average unemployment, IJK(LB ).
4.3.3. Model 3
Model 3 uses 012 31 + 1000 6
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78 as the dependent variable, which is

based on the dollar amount of back wages owed by a firm f employing workers in occupation o
and commuting zone cz in year t. The following regression is estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) with robust standard errors:

(3)

012 31 + 1000 6
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78 = LC + L) M.8=,4 + L% ::;2,8=,4 + O> + P2 + Q4 +

N012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @ + Y>,2,8=,4
where L) and L% are the parameters of interest and Y>,2,8=,4 is a stochastic disturbance term
satisfying the usual properties.

34

See Buis (2010).
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In Model 3, L) reflects the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase (above the average)
in the unemployment rate, whereas L% reflects the effect on the log of back wages of moving
from a competitive labor market (HHIo,cz,t = 0) to a monopsony (HHIo,cz,t = 1). A full set of
indicators for firms, O> , occupations, P2 , and years, Q4 , are included. Estimation results for
Model 3 are reported in Panel A of Table 4 in section 5.3. For comparison, Panel B reports
estimation results when firm indicators are excluded.
4.3.4. Model 4
Model 4 augments Model 3 with additional covariates, namely SUBf (the inclusion of
which requires omitting the firm effect, O> , from the model) and its interactions with URcz,t and
HHIo,cz,t. Table 5 in section 5.4 reports OLS estimation results for the following Model 4.

(4)

012 31 + 1000 6
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+ LA VM?> ::;2,8=,4 + LB VM?> M.8=,4 + P2 + Q4 + X8= + N012>:1?=>,2,8=,4 @ + Y>,2,8=,4
Consider the effect on the dependent variable of a one-standard-deviation increase in URcz,t
(above its average value), in a competitive labor market (when ::;2,8=,4 = 0). That effect is L) in
lead firms (when SUBf = 0) and L) + LB in subcontractor firms (when VM?> = 1). Next consider
the effect on the dependent variable of a shift from a competitive market (::;2,8=,4 = 0) to a
monopsony (::;2,8=,4 = 1) when the unemployment rate remains at its average. That effect is L%
in lead firms and L% + LA in subcontractor firms. Finally, consider the effect on the dependent
variable of a shift from lead firm status to subcontractor status when the unemployment rate
remains at its average. That effect is L@ + LA in a monopsony market and L@ in a competitive
labor market, whereas it is L@ + LB in a competitive labor market if the unemployment rate is one
standard deviation above its average.
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4.3.5. Model 5
Section 3.2.2. predicts that firms in more competitive markets not only have more
violations than firms in monopsony markets, they also are more likely to exit the market. To
analyze the probability that a firm exits the market or has a violation the data are aggregated to
the firm level. HHI and UR are weighted by the number of H-1Bs. Given that many firms appear
for only one or two years in the data, the following analysis focuses on the subset of firms that
has observations for at least 4 consecutive years. EverExit is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the
firm ever drops out of the H-1B labor market, and 0 otherwise. EverViol is a dummy variable
equaling 1 if the firm ever commits a violation, and 0 otherwise. The following probit model is
estimated for both dependent variables, EverExit and EverViol:
(5)

Pr(A\I]AJDF = 1 | L) M., L% ::;, `12(:1?=)) = a(LC + L) M. + L% ::; +

`12(:1?=))
The data are also aggregated at the firm-year level. HHI and UR are weighted by the
number of H-1Bs. The dependent variable, Exitit, which is only defined if firm i is present in the
data set for at least four consecutive years, equals 1 if firm i dropped out of the data set in year t
or if it dropped out of the data set in year t+1, and otherwise it equals 0. At the firm-year level,
the following probit model is estimated for firm exits, where Yeart is a dummy variable equaling
1 in year t and 0 otherwise:
(6)

Pr(AJDF14 = 1 | bc) = a(LC + L) M.1,4'% + L% ::;1,4'% +
`12>1 + :1?=1,4'% @ + dIE]4 )

The independent variables (HHI, UR) and control variable Log(1+ H-1B) are each lagged two
years. Thus, changes in these variables in year t-2 are mapped to changes in the exit probability
in the subsequent two years (t-1 and t) in the empirical model.
With the same data at the firm-year level, a violation (Violationit = 1) is defined as having
occurred if firm i has one or more recorded violations in year t, with the variable equaling 0
otherwise. The following probit model is estimated for firm i's violations in year t:
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(7)

Pr( CD10EFD1G14 = 1 | eDE c) = a(LC + L) M.1,4') + L% ::;1,4'), +
`12>1 + :1?=1,4') @ + dIE]4 )

Predicted marginal effects that exit or a violation ever occurred are reported in Panel A of Table
6. Predicted probabilities that exit or a violation ever occurred are reported in Panel A of Table 7
at critical values of UR (0,1) and HHI (0,1). Marginal effects and probabilities that exit or
violation occurred in a given year are reported in Panel B of Tables 6 and 7, respectively, where
the marginal effects are evaluated at the means of all variables. Results weighted by the number
of H-1Bs and unweighted results are reported. Figure 5 illustrates the unweighted results.
5. Estimation Results
The next five sections report estimation results for each of the four statistical models
described in section 4.3. Section 5.6 then summarizes the results of sensitivity analyses, and
section 5.7 discusses limitations of the analysis.
5.1. Model 1
Table 2’s Panel A reports results from estimation of Model 1 treating O> as a fixed effect.
Recall from section 4.3.1 that the exponentiated coefficients measure the proportional change in
the count of violations. The following pattern is revealed: 1) given that the exponentiated
coefficients of UR exceed 1, wage and hour violations are more likely in markets with higher
unemployment rates; and 2) given that the exponentiated coefficients of HHI are less than 1,
wage and hour violations are less likely in a pure monopsony than in a competitive labor market.
In column (4) of Panel A, which reports the results based on the richest set of controls, the effect
of a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate is a 13.8% increase in the count of
violations, and the average effect of moving from a labor market with no concentration to a
monopsony market is a 54% decrease in the count of violations.
Table 2’s Panel B reports estimation results for Model 1 treating O> as a random effect. In
column (4) of Panel B, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate
is a 16.6% increase in the count of violations, and the average effect of moving from a labor
market with no concentration to a monopsony market is a 51% decrease in the count of
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violations. Panels A and B are similar, revealing that whether the individual firm effect, O> , is
treated as a fixed or random is not of major consequence for the results of interest. In both Panels
A and B, the effect of log(H-1Bs) is positive, as anticipated, which simply states that more H1Bs are associated with more violations. Table 2’s bottom line is that a worsening of economic
conditions is associated with more violations, whereas an increase in concentration is associated
with fewer violations. Those empirical results are consistent with section 3’s theoretical model.
5.2. Model 2
Table 3 reports results from estimation of Model 2 from section 4.3.2. The main effect of
economic conditions that was reported in Model 1 continues to hold in Model 2: in all eight
specifications, as economic conditions worsen, the incidence of violations increases; seven of
these results are statistically significant at K ≤ 0.10. Several new empirical results emerge as
well: 1) across the specifications, subcontractors are much more likely to have wage and hour
violations, 2) the negative effect of monopsony on violations is statistically insignificant for lead
firms following the inclusion of the firm-level subcontractor variable and interactions, 3)
subcontractors are much less likely to have wage and hour violations when the labor market is
monopsonistic than when it is perfectly competitive, and 4) independent of the main effect of
unemployment rates, subcontractors are more likely to have wage and hour violations in a higher
unemployment rate environment.
Turning attention to the fullest set of controls in column (8) with indicators for year,
occupation, and commuting zone, the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the
unemployment rate is a 19.5% increase in the count of violations, the effect of concentration is
statistically insignificant for lead firms, and the effect of being a subcontractor is a 1526%
increase in the count of violations compared to the baseline case of a lead firm in a competitive
market at average unemployment. Interaction terms reveal that a subcontractor in a monopsony
is expected to have 91% fewer violations than a subcontractor in a competitive market would
have. A subcontractor in a labor market with a one-standard-deviation increase in the
unemployment rate is expected to have an increase in the rate of violations of 24.3% compared
to non-subcontractors. Interpreting these results in light of the theoretical model’s predictions,
subcontractor firms have greater incentive to commit wage theft than lead firms, and in these
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firms in particular, the model’s predicted effects of economic conditions and concentration are
particularly strong.35 The interaction terms add nuance to the story: much of the main effect of
labor market power occurs through subcontractor firms. A possible explanation is discussed in
the conclusion.
5.3. Model 3
Table 4’s Panel A reports results from estimation of Model 3. Panel A provides a withinfirm estimate of the log of the amount of back wages owed, rather than a count of the number of
wage and hour violations. Several patterns found in Table 2 are repeated: 1) back wages are
higher in markets with higher unemployment rates, and 2) back wages are lower in a pure
monopsony compared to a competitive labor market. As seen in column (4) of Panel A, the
expected effect of moving from a labor market with no concentration to a monopsony is a 2.15%
decrease in back wages per 1000 H-1Bs, and the effect of one-standard-deviation increase in the
unemployment rate is a 0.63% increase in back wages per 1000 H-1Bs.
Panel B reports results from estimation of Model 3 dropping the firm-specific indicators.
The results are consistent with Panel A, demonstrating that the results of interest do not rely on
within-firm analysis. Results are consistent across the 4 specifications of Panel A and the 4
specifications of Panel B. Results are consistent with the estimates presented in Table 2 and with
the theoretical model in section 3.
5.4. Model 4
Table 5 reports results from estimation of Model 4 of section 4.3.4. Recall that it
augments Model 3 to add the commuting zone control, the subcontractor indicator, the
interaction between the subcontractor indicator and HHI, and the interaction between the
subcontractor indicator and the unemployment rate. The main effect of UR on back wages is
positive in all eight specifications and is statistically significant at K ≤ 0.02 in six specifications.
The main effect of SUB is positive, significant, and stable across the eight specifications. The

35
One possible explanation for this result is that subcontractors and firms in more competitive markets face a higher
probability of being caught engaging in wage theft.
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main effect of HHI is unstable and oscillates between negative and positive in the eight
specifications, while the interaction between the subcontractor indicator and HHI (UR) is
negative (positive), significant, and stable.
In column (8) with the richest set of controls, the effect of a one-standard-deviation
increase in the unemployment rate is a non-significant 0.24% increase in back wages per 1000
H-1Bs in lead firms. A lead firm is expected to owe a non-significant 0.23% more in back wages
per 1000 H-1Bs in a monopsony market compared to a competitive market. A subcontractor firm
owes 20.1% more per 1000 H-1Bs than a lead firm in a competitive labor market at average
unemployment. The interaction terms reveal that a subcontractor in a monopsony is expected to
owe 4.7% (L@ + LA ) less in back wages per 1000 H-1Bs than a subcontractor in a competitive
market. A subcontractor in a competitive labor market with a one-standard-deviation increase in
the unemployment rate is expected to have an increase in back wages of 22% (L@ + LB ) per 1000
H-1Bs compared to a subcontractor in a competitive labor market with average unemployment.
As above, the main effect occurs through the subcontractor variable, and a possible explanation
is discussed in the conclusion.
5.5. Model 5: Firm Exits and Violations
Table 6 reports the unweighted (columns 1 and 2) and population-weighted (columns 3
and 4) marginal effects at the mean of a one-unit increase in the predictors, UR and HHI, on the
probability that a firm exits the sample (columns 1 and 3) or that a firm has a violation (columns
2 and 4). Table 7 reports the probability of exit and violations at critical values of HHI (0,1) and
UR (0,1). Panel A of each table reports probabilities for a firm that ever exits or has a violation,
and Panel B reports probabilities that a firm exits or has a violation in a given year, based upon
the prior year’s HHI and UR. Figure 5 illustrates that: 1) probability of exit or violation is
consistently higher when UR is one standard deviation above the mean, 2) as HHI increases, the
probability of exit or violation decreases.
5.6. Sensitivity Analysis
The main results from Models 1 and 2 use Violations as a dependent variable only in a
negative binomial model, rely on a single definition of the relevant labor market, and are
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unweighted. Appendix Tables A.1 through A.6 provide estimates that check whether the results
are sensitive to the transformation of the dependent variable, the choice of negative binomial or
linear probability model, the weighting scheme, or the definition of the relevant labor market at a
granular or aggregated occupational (or industry) level. The present section discusses these
results that are presented in the Appendix.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix 1 repeat the analysis in Tables 2 and 3 using OLS on the
012.34125/",$,%&,'

alternative 012 31 + 1000 6

6)7/",$,%&,'

78, as was used in the Marinescu, Qiu, and Sojourner

(2021) analysis. In the linear probability models, the dependent variable is not rounded to the
nearest integer as was done to produce the dependent variable for the count models. Results with
the alternative dependent variable and the linear probability model are similar to results obtained
from the negative binomial model.
Weighting is another consideration. The main estimates are unweighted and represent the
effect on Violations in a firm in a labor market as the unit of analysis. Given that the firm makes
the decision to violate or not violate wage and hour law, estimating the effect on whether an
average firm has a wage and hour violation, rather than the effect on whether an average worker
experiences a violation, is preferred in this study. Weighting yields a different interpretation than
the unweighted analysis, involving the expected change in the count of violations for an
individual H-1B worker, rather than the change expected for a firm, occupation, commuting
zone, and year. Tables A.3 and A.4 report results that weight by the number of guest workers in a
given firm in a labor market with dependent variables 012 31 + 1000 6
012 31 + 1000 6

738+ #3:;/",$,%&,'
6)7/",$,%&,'

012.34125/",$,%&,'
6)7/",$,%&,'

78 and

78, respectively. Results are similar to unweighted results.

Given that these data are unusually comprehensive and allow a firm-level matched
dataset and within-firm regressions, the main analyses here are more granular than analysis at the
labor market level. However, given that other analyses may be reported at the labor market level,
the dataset is aggregated, and results are presented at the labor market level in Tables A.5 and
A.6. In both tables A.5 and A.6, the dependent variable Violations is at the labor market and year
level, not at the firm, labor market, and year level. Negative binomial regressions with robust
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standard errors are estimated. Table A.5 uses a labor market defined at the year, commuting
zone, and occupation level. Given the potential sensitivity of results to the definition of the labor
market as described in section 4.1.2, Table A.6 uses a labor market defined at the year,
commuting zone, and industry level. In Table A.6, the variable HHI is calculated as
5
%
::;1,8=,4 = < =>,1,8=,4
1?)

where 2-digit NAICS code industry i substitutes for occupation o. Results presented feature
industry indicators instead of occupation. Results obtained at either the occupation or the
industry labor market level are similar to the main firm-level analyses.
The analyses of Tables A.1 through A.6 demonstrate that results are not sensitive to the
choice of negative binomial or OLS regression, weighted or unweighted analysis, level of
aggregation, or industrial versus occupational definition of the relevant labor market.
5.7. Limitations
Under-reporting of violations is a concern that is not unique to the WHISARD data,
and should be borne in mind when interpreting results. Evidence suggests that one wage and
hour complaint is made for every 130 violations (Weil and Pyles, 2005). Another limitation is
that the only observations in the violations data are the ones for which wage theft allegations
were first reported to the WHD, then investigated, and then yielded a satisfactory conclusion.
The resulting survivorship bias, in which only the firms that get caught are listed in the dataset,
could tilt the results toward the firms that are unable to escape scrutiny. The possibility of
survivorship bias notwithstanding, it remains the case that the WHISARD data are the most
comprehensive data available on this subject. Moreover, guest workers represent a rare
population – possibly the only population – for which the WHISARD data set is likely to contain
the complete administrative record. Furthermore, examining the relationship within firm, as done
here, suggests that this study’s main result is robust to this concern.
6. Conclusion
The main results of this study are that increases in the unemployment rate are associated
with more wage theft against H-1Bs, whereas increases in the degree of labor market
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concentration are associated with less. Additionally, both effects are amplified in subcontractor
firms, which themselves are more likely than lead firms to engage in wage theft. A theoretical
framework is also introduced in which the preceding results can be interpreted.
The theoretical model offers insight concerning several recent or proposed changes to the
H-1B program. A federal regulation first developed under the Trump administration and now
being evaluated by the Biden administration would raise the prevailing wage requirement. Given
that it would raise the prevailing wage at every experience level rather than just for the lowestpaid workers who are heavily concentrated in subcontractor firms, the proposed change could
raise the prevailing wage more at lead than at subcontractor firms. Such a policy change could
increase wage theft by removing more lead firms from the market for guest workers, and in fact,
lead firms have increasingly been crowded out by a secondary labor market that specializes in
obtaining scarce visas and then outsourcing H-1Bs’ labor. Such a policy effect would run counter
to the program’s aim of attracting high-skill, high-wage workers in occupations experiencing
shortages (Sharma and Sparber 2020).
One approach to counter the secondary labor market would raise the skill and prevailing
wage requirements for the H-1B. A USCIS regulation in late 2020 (not implemented as of March
2021) would replace the lottery for H-1B visas with a ranking system based upon skill and wage.
Contrary to ordinary intuition that raising wage floors would increase non-compliance (Clemens
and Strain 2020), increasing skill and prevailing wage requirements for the H-1B program could
increase compliance by decreasing the use of the program by subcontractors and by limiting the
program to H-1Bs in occupations with lower unemployment rates (which tend to have higher
wage and skill requirements). Raising the bottom of the wage floor for H-1Bs could lead lowwage subcontractor firms (whose wages are bunched around the $60,000 floor) to drop out of
program participation if wage costs are too high.
Another channel for increasing compliance that this study identifies is raising fines k or
lowering the critical threshold for violation, k*. An unusual law prohibits the Department of
Labor from engaging in proactive or strategic investigations of H-1B employers unless the
Department possesses “reasonable cause” for launching an investigation (see Appendix B). In
light of that law, measures that make it easy (and personally advantageous) for workers to report
wage theft could increase the probability, p, that non-compliant firms are caught. Those
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measures might include special visas for guest workers who report wage theft, education
campaigns, targeted online advertising, and easy-to-submit complaints. Given that the H-1B
program is small relative to both the size of the economy and the amount of wage theft, such a
targeted online awareness campaign could serve as a pilot for a potential broad effort to increase
compliance with wage and hour laws.
The theoretical framework and empirical results offer several additional insights into
combatting wage theft generally. First, a tight labor market is less likely to be a market in which
firms can underpay workers. Second, while monopsonies do lower wages, reducing monopsony
power directly via anti-trust enforcement does not seem a promising route to reducing wage
theft. Finally, while Weil (2018) attributes non-compliance in “fissured” workplaces to small
margins in the product market, the present study’s model and empirical results suggest an
alternative explanation: non-compliance is increased by a dual labor market of workers (with low
reservation wages) who are unable to leave the secondary sector of temporary, subcontractor,
and staffing type firms.
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Figure 1
WAGE-SETTING CHOICES FACING THE MONOPSONIST
PANEL A: MONOPSONY “COMPLIANCE” AND “NON-COMPLIANCE” REGIONS OF (p,k)
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PANEL B: &.∗ (p) FOR LEAD FIRMS AND &/∗ (p) FOR SUBCONTRACTORS
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Figure 2
AVERAGE HHI AND THE COUNT OF VIOLATIONS (0, ≤5, > 6)
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Figure 3
AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND THE COUNT OF VIOLATIONS (0, ≤5, > 6)
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Figure 4
POST-2005 KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATE OF WAGES OFFERED BY SUBCONTRACTOR/LEAD FIRM
STATUS
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wage floor to avoid additional labor market tests for H-1B-dependent firms that was effective
after Fiscal Year 2005.
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Figure 5
PROBABILITIES A FIRM EXITS OR VIOLATES
Probability a Firm Exits

Probability a Firm Has a Violation
.04

Pr(Ever Violate)

Ever

Pr(Ever Exit)

.8
.7
.6
.5
.4

.03
.02
.01
0

.3
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

HHI
1SD + UR

Mean UR

Pr(Violation at time t)

Pr(Exit at time t)

.22
.21
.2
.19
.18
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

HHI at t−1
1SD + UR(t−1)

.6

1SD + UR

.23

At time t
based
upon HHIt1 and
URt-1

.5

.7

.8

.9

1

.9

1

HHI
Mean UR

.015

.01

.005

0
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

HHI at t−1
Mean UR(t−1)

1SD + UR(t−1)

42

Mean UR(t−1)

Table 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1a. Descriptive Statistics for Conditional Fixed Effects Sample (Table 1a)
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Violations
2.293
15.197
0.000
485.000
% of Cells with any Violations
0.201
0.400
0.000
1.000
Back Wages ($)
8,690.01
68,682.85
0.000
2,159,247.49
Number of H-1Bs
16.368
23.167
0.000
70.000
HHI
0.149
0.171
0.001
1.000
Unemployment Rate (UR %)
6.217
2.164
2.406
26.797
Standardized UR
0.095
1.050
-1.755
10.083
Subcontractor (SUB)
0.597
0.491
0.000
1.000
Observations
25,683
1b. Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample (Tables 1b - Model 4)
Violations
% of Cells with any Violations
Back Wages
Number of H-1Bs
HHI
Unemployment Rate (UR %)
Standardized UR
Subcontractor (SUB)
Observations

Mean
0.044
0.004
172.946
3.509
0.142
6.022
-0.000
0.071
1,353,017
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SD
2.118
0.064
9,570.912
9.124
0.190
2.060
1.000
0.256

Min
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
1.165
-2.357
0.000

Max
484.698
1.000
2,159,247.49
70.000
1.000
26.797
10.083
1.000

Table 2
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET POWER ON WAGE AND HOUR
VIOLATIONS
Panel A: Conditional Firm Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
1.161***
1.147*
1.152***
1.138*
(0.0379)
(0.0660)
(0.0386)
(0.0583)
HHI
0.271***
0.525**
0.233***
0.456**
(0.0590)
(0.117)
(0.0531)
(0.122)
Log(H-1Bs)
1.435***
1.447***
1.341***
1.344***
(0.0498)
(0.0403)
(0.0440)
(0.0474)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Firm
Y
Y
Y
Y
Number of Groups
1218
1218
1218
1218
N
25,673
25,673
25,673
25,673
Panel B: Between Firm Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
1.189***
1.166**
1.187***
1.166*
(0.0413)
(0.0689)
(0.0312)
(0.0752)
HHI
0.329***
0.581**
0.262***
0.493***
(0.0671)
(0.103)
(0.0537)
(0.0976)
Log(H-1Bs)
1.813***
1.836***
1.631***
1.645***
(0.0728)
(0.0688)
(0.0578)
(0.0737)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Commuting Zone
Y
Y
Y
Y
Number of Groups
453,471
453,471
453,471
453,471
N
1,351,775
1,351,775
1,351,775
1,351,775
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. These regressions use STATA’s xtnbreg command. The top
panel has conditional firm fixed effects, the bottom panel removes firm fixed effects and uses
random effects. The dependent variable is the count of violations within a firm, year, commuting
zone, and occupation. Exponentiated parameter estimates are reported, with bootstrapped
standard errors of the coefficient in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients are
exponentiated and reflect the change in violations for a one standard deviation above average
increase in the unemployment rate and a move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null
hypothesis that an individual predictor has no effect.
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Table 3
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, LABOR MARKET POWER, AND SUBCONTRACTOR STATUS ON WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATIONS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
UR
1.246***
1.342***
1.112**
1.174*** 1.125*** 1.367***
1.036
1.195*
(0.0693)
(0.144)
(0.0473)
(0.0614)
(0.0467)
(0.107)
(0.125)
(0.123)
HHI
0.496***
0.946
0.294***
1.761
0.295***
0.568**
6.507***
1.068
(0.135)
(0.254)
(0.0861)
(0.697)
(0.107)
(0.148)
(2.387)
(0.366)
SUB
33.33***
59.23***
18.49*** 17.35*** 11.57*** 31.89*** 21.12*** 15.26***
(6.697)
(15.57)
(2.342)
(3.253)
(1.304)
(5.266)
(3.293)
(1.673)
0.0110*** 0.00996*** 0.0393*** 0.0290*** 0.0894*** 0.0331*** 0.0440*** 0.0898***
SUB × HHI
(0.00766) (0.00821)
(0.0254)
(0.0196)
(0.0508)
(0.0245)
(0.0280)
(0.0511)
1.195
0.992
1.318***
1.291**
1.366***
1.106
1.181
1.243***
SUB × UR
(0.156)
(0.135)
(0.115)
(0.156)
(0.110)
(0.102)
(0.126)
(0.0957)
Log(H-1Bs)
3.856***
3.567***
3.063*** 3.803*** 2.983*** 2.749*** 3.618*** 2.818***
(0.181)
(0.153)
(0.118)
(0.146)
(0.102)
(0.105)
(0.130)
(0.0924)
Year
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Occupation
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Commuting Zone
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786 1,351,786
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. SUB = subcontractor. This is an unconditional negative binomial regression. The dependent
variable is the count of violations within a firm, year, commuting zone, and occupation. Exponentiated parameter estimates are
reported, with bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficient in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients are exponentiated
and reflect the change in the rate of violations for a one standard deviation above average increase in the unemployment rate and a
move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that an individual predictor has no
effect.

45

Table 4
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET POWER ON LOG(1+ BACK WAGES
PER 1000 H-1BS)
Panel A: Within Firm Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.00113
0.00615**
0.00126
0.00625**
(0.00131)
(0.00300)
(0.00131)
(0.00300)
HHI
-0.0483***
-0.0249***
-0.0434***
-0.0215**
(0.00837)
(0.00836)
(0.00881)
(0.00880)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0173***
0.0166***
0.0216***
0.0211***
(0.00332)
(0.00332)
(0.00327)
(0.00328)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Firm
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
Number of Groups
419,731
419,731
419,731
419,731
N
1,237,770
1,237,770
1,237,770
1,237,770
Panel B: Between Firm Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.00645***
0.00737***
0.00654***
0.00786***
(0.000749)
(0.00122)
(0.000749)
(0.00123)
HHI
-0.0387***
-0.0238***
-0.0382***
-0.0224***
(0.00342)
(0.00337)
(0.00364)
(0.00359)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0890***
0.0898***
0.0888***
0.0897***
(0.00221)
(0.00222)
(0.00219)
(0.00220)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Commuting Zone
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
N
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent
!"#$ &"'()!,#,$%,&

variable is !"# $1 + 1000 (

*+!)!,#,$%,&

)*. Parameter estimates are reported, with robust

standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients reflect the average change in
the log of back wages for a one standard deviation above average increase in the unemployment
rate and a move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01.
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Table 5
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, LABOR MARKET POWER, AND SUBCONTRACTOR ON LOG(1+ BACK WAGES PER 1000 H-1BS)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
UR
0.00397*** 0.00695*** 0.00399*** 0.00276*** 0.00268*** 0.00729***
0.00227
0.00243
(0.000637)
(0.00119)
(0.000638)
(0.000736)
(0.000736)
(0.00119)
(0.00203) (0.00203)
HHI
-0.0272*** -0.0105*** -0.0258*** -0.0208***
-0.0271*** -0.00828*** 0.00881**
0.00229
(0.00277)
(0.00277)
(0.00297)
(0.00411)
(0.00449)
(0.00297)
(0.00419) (0.00456)
SUB
0.203***
0.211***
0.202***
0.194***
0.193***
0.210***
0.202***
0.201***
(0.00918)
(0.00924)
(0.00923)
(0.00924)
(0.00928)
(0.00929)
(0.00930) (0.00933)
-0.261***
-0.256***
-0.263***
-0.251***
-0.250***
-0.259***
-0.248*** -0.248***
SUB × HHI
(0.0300)
(0.0300)
(0.0300)
(0.0308)
(0.0308)
(0.0300)
(0.0307)
(0.0307)
0.0277***
0.0229***
0.0278***
0.0251***
0.0251***
0.0229*** 0.0199*** 0.0198***
SUB × UR
(0.00670)
(0.00675)
(0.00670)
(0.00671)
(0.00671)
(0.00675)
(0.00677) (0.00677)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0700***
0.0699***
0.0708***
0.0680***
0.0690***
0.0707*** 0.0678*** 0.0689***
(0.00225)
(0.00225)
(0.00222)
(0.00224)
(0.00222)
(0.00222)
(0.00225) (0.00222)
Year
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Occupation
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Commuting Zone
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
2
R
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
N
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779 1,237,779
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. SUB = Subcontractor. This is an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is
"#$ %1 + 1000 )

!"#$ &"'()!,#,$%,&
*+!)!,#,$%,&

*+. This model is estimated at the firm, year, commuting zone, and occupation level. Parameter

estimates are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that an individual predictor has no
effect.
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Table 6
MARGINAL EFFECTS: CHANGE IN PROBABILITY AT MEAN
Panel A: Change in Probability a Firm Ever Exits or Violates
Unweighted
#
!"
&
$$%
N

Population Weighted

Ever Exits

Ever Violates

Ever Exits

Ever Violates

0.0976***

0.00221***

0.00176***

0.0255***

(0.00432)

(0.000645)

(0.000471)

(0.000349)

-0.438***

-0.0135***

-0.446***

-0.124***

(0.0183)

(0.00321)

(0.00229)

(0.00122)

38,198

38,198

3,246,335

3,246,335

Panel B: Change in Probability a Firm Exits or Violates at t=0
URt-1
HHIt-1
N

Exit at t

Violation at t

Exit at t

Violation at t

0.00787***

0.000937***

0.000378***

0.00165***

(0.00134)

(0.000159)

(0.000112)

(0.000241)

-0.0321***

-0.00322***

-0.00329***

-0.0240***

(0.00553)

(0.000684)

(0.000433)

(0.000899)

225,304

225,304

2,601,607

2,601,607

Note: Standard errors are robust. This Table reports the marginal effect of a one standard
deviation increase in the average unemployment rate (UR) and the effect of a firm’s workers
being located in a monopsony (HHI=1) compared to a competitive market on the probability of
firm exit from the panel and firm violations at mean values of UR and HHI. Panel A estimates
the marginal effect on the probability that a firm ever exits or has a violation using average UR
and HHI a firm faces for the duration of the study and includes a control for the log of the
number of H-1Bs in a firm. Panel B estimates the probability that a firm exits or has a violation
in a given year with prior year’s HHI and UR as predictors, and also includes controls for H-1B
population and year indicator variables.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null
hypothesis that an individual predictor has no effect.
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Table 7
MARGINAL EFFECTS: PROBABILITIES AT CRITICAL VALUES
Panel A: Probability a Firm Ever Exits or Violates
Unweighted

Population Weighted

Ever Exits

Ever Violates

Ever Exits

Ever Violates

# = 0, $$%
&=0
!"

0.710

0.0291

0.351

0.155

# = 1, $$%
&=0
!"

0.785

0.0342

0.353

0.186

# = 0, $$%
&=1
!"

0.300

0.00995

0.0680

0.0523

# = 1, $$%
&=1
!"

0.390

0.0120

0.0686

0.0669

N

38,198

38,198

3,246,335

3,246,335

Panel B: Probability a Firm Ever Exits or Violates at t=0
Exit at t

Violation at t

Exit at t

Violation at t

URt-1=0, HHIt-1=0

0.221

0.0109

0.0859

0.0459

URt-1=1, HHIt-1=0

0.229

0.0132

0.0879

0.0502

URt-1=0, HHIt-1=1

0.190

0.00557

0.0607

0.0158

URt-1=, HHIt-1=1

0.198

0.00681

0.0623

0.0176

N

225,304

225,304

2,601,607

2,601,607
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Appendix A - Tables and Figures
Table A.1
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET POWER ON LOG(1 + VIOLATIONS
PER 1000 H-1BS)
Panel A: Within Firm Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.00485***
0.00631***
0.00488***
0.00631***
(0.000589)
(0.00138)
(0.000589)
(0.00138)
HHI
-0.0245***
-0.0133***
-0.0237***
-0.0132***
(0.00341)
(0.00340)
(0.00355)
(0.00354)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.00618***
0.00597***
0.00638***
0.00626***
(0.00137)
(0.00137)
(0.00136)
(0.00136)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Firm
Y
Y
Y
Y
R2
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
Number of Groups
419,731
419,731
419,731
419,731
N
1,237,770
1,237,770
1,237,770
1,237,770
Panel B: Between Firm Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.00572***
0.00537***
0.00586***
0.00578***
(0.000382)
(0.000616)
(0.000383)
(0.000619)
HHI
-0.0188***
-0.0113***
-0.0195***
-0.0114***
(0.00147)
(0.00144)
(0.00156)
(0.00153)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0453***
0.0457***
0.0434***
0.0439***
(0.000999)
(0.00100)
(0.000973)
(0.000978)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Commuting Zone
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
N
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent
!"#$%&"#'(!,#,$%,&

variable is *+, -1 + 1000 /

)*+(!,#,$%,&

01 within a firm, year, commuting zone, and

occupation. Parameter estimates are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses below
each estimate. The coefficients reflect the change in the dependent variable for a one standard
deviation above average increase in the unemployment rate and a move from a competitive
market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01.
A.1

Table A.2
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, LABOR MARKET POWER, AND SUBCONTRACTOR ON LOG(1 + VIOLATIONS PER 1000 H-1BS)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
UR
0.00286***
0.00370*** 0.00298***
0.00244***
0.00245*** 0.00402***
0.00149
0.00152
(0.000316)
(0.000589)
(0.000317)
(0.000358)
(0.000359)
(0.000591)
(0.000985)
(0.000985)
HHI
-0.0103***
-0.00201
-0.0106*** -0.00845*** -0.0142***
-0.00174
0.00633***
0.000717
(0.00126)
(0.00125)
(0.00134)
(0.00183)
(0.00201)
(0.00134)
(0.00185)
(0.00202)
SUB
0.111***
0.115***
0.109***
0.106***
0.105***
0.113***
0.110***
0.108***
(0.00414)
(0.00416)
(0.00415)
(0.00417)
(0.00418)
(0.00417)
(0.00419)
(0.00420)
-0.168***
-0.166***
-0.167***
-0.162***
-0.160***
-0.165***
-0.161***
-0.159***
SUB × HHI
(0.0121)
(0.0120)
(0.0121)
(0.0124)
(0.0124)
(0.0120)
(0.0124)
(0.0124)
0.0370***
0.0349***
0.0369***
0.0353***
0.0352***
0.0348***
0.0330***
0.0329***
SUB × UR
(0.00350)
(0.00352)
(0.00350)
(0.00350)
(0.00350)
(0.00352)
(0.00352)
(0.00352)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0354***
0.0354***
0.0342***
0.0345***
0.0335***
0.0343***
0.0344***
0.0335***
(0.00101)
(0.00101)
(0.000983)
(0.00101)
(0.000986)
(0.000984)
(0.00101)
(0.000987)
Year
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Occupation
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Commuting Zone
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
2
R
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
N
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,779
1,237,750
1,237,750
1,237,779
1,237,750
1,237,750
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. SUB = Subcontractor. This is an ordinary least squares regression. This model is estimated at the
firm, year, commuting zone, and occupation level. The dependent variable is "#$ %1 + 1000 )

!"#$%&"#'(!,#,$%,&
)*+(

*+ within a firm, year,

occupation, and commuting zone. Parameter estimates are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that an individual predictor has no
effect.

A.2

Table A.3
WEIGHTED OLS REGRESSION: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET
POWER ON LOG(1 + VIOLATIONS PER 1000 H-1BS)
Panel A: Within Firm Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.0106***
0.0112***
0.0105***
0.0112***
(0.000436)
(0.00105)
(0.000437)
(0.00105)
HHI
-0.106***
-0.0384***
-0.111***
-0.0470***
(0.00244)
(0.00241)
(0.00252)
(0.00248)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0215***
0.0213***
0.0198***
0.0196***
(0.000509)
(0.000511)
(0.000517)
(0.000520)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Firm
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.47
Number of Groups
419,731
419,731
419,731
419,731
N
4,746,618
4,746,618
4,746,618
4,746,618
Panel B: Between Firm Ordinary Least Squares
UR
0.0174***
0.0187***
0.0187***
0.0198***
(0.000406)
(0.000710)
(0.000406)
(0.000709)
HHI
-0.119***
-0.0669***
-0.109***
-0.0492***
(0.00151)
(0.00147)
(0.00158)
(0.00153)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0662***
0.0702***
0.0533***
0.0568***
(0.000263)
(0.000275)
(0.000236)
(0.000246)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Commuting Zone
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.03
N
4,746,628
4,746,628
4,746,628
4,746,628
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is a weighted ordinary least squared regression. The
dependent variable is "#$ %1 + 1000 ∗ *

!"#$%&"#'(!,#,$%,&
)*+(!,#,$%,&

+, within a firm, year, commuting zone,

and occupation. Parameter estimates are reported, with standard errors in parentheses below each
estimate. The coefficients reflect the change in the log of the count of violations for a one
standard deviation above average increase in the unemployment rate and a move from a
competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null
hypothesis that an individual predictor has no effect.
A.3

Table A.4
WEIGHTED OLS REGRESSION: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET
POWER ON LOG(1+ BACK WAGES PER 1000 H-1BS)
Panel A: Within Firm Weighted Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
-0.0179***
0.0110***
-0.0173***
0.0114***
(0.000990)
(0.00231)
(0.000991)
(0.00231)
HHI
-0.165***
-0.0402***
-0.160***
-0.0424***
(0.00616)
(0.00612)
(0.00635)
(0.00630)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.0608***
0.0592***
0.0676***
0.0659***
(0.00124)
(0.00124)
(0.00123)
(0.00123)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Firm
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.35
0.36
0.35
0.36
Number of Groups
419,731
419,731
419,731
419,731
N
4,746,618
4,746,618
4,746,618
4,746,618
Panel B: Between Firm Weighted Ordinary Least Squares
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
UR
0.00888***
0.0293***
0.0109***
0.0307***
(0.000786)
(0.00137)
(0.000786)
(0.00138)
HHI
-0.211***
-0.110***
-0.189***
-0.0753***
(0.00364)
(0.00355)
(0.00380)
(0.00371)
Log(H-1Bs)
0.138***
0.145***
0.122***
0.128***
(0.000595)
(0.000616)
(0.000566)
(0.000581)
Year
N
Y
N
Y
Occ
N
N
Y
Y
Commuting Zone
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
R
0.013
0.022
0.016
0.025
N
4,746,628
4,746,628
4,746,628
4,746,628
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is a weighted ordinary least squares regression. The
+%,- /%01(!,#,$%,&

dependent variable is "#$ %1 + 1000 *

)*+(!,#,$%,&

+,. Parameter estimates are reported, with

robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients reflect the average
change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation above average increase in the
unemployment rate and a move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01.
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Table A.5
OCCUPATION DEFINED LABOR MARKET LEVEL ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET POWER ON
VIOLATIONS

UR
HHI
Log(H-1Bs)

(1)
0.891*
(0.0527)
0.246***
(0.0762)
2.205***
(0.0967)
N
N
N

(2)
0.845***
(0.0500)
0.246***
(0.0569)
2.361***
(0.0618)
Y
N
N

(3)
0.950
(0.0372)
0.186***
(0.0414)
2.042***
(0.0658)
N
Y
N

(4)
1.186***
(0.0233)
0.264***
(0.0722)
2.494***
(0.0724)
N
N
Y

(5)
1.133***
(0.0201)
0.332***
(0.0796)
1.724***
(0.0428)
N
Y
Y

(6)
0.866***
(0.0415)
0.191***
(0.0377)
2.140***
(0.0537)
Y
Y
N

(7)
1.439***
(0.134)
0.354***
(0.0927)
2.521***
(0.0654)
Y
N
Y

Year
Occupation
Commuting
Zone
N
56,237
56,237
56,237
56,155
56,237
56,237
56,155
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is a negative binomial regression. This model is estimated at the year-labor market level, as
defined by year, occupation, and commuting zone. The dependent variable is violations within a labor market and year. Exponentiated
parameter estimates are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients are exponentiated
and reflect the change in the rate of violations for a one standard deviation above average increase in the unemployment rate and a
move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that an individual predictor has no
effect.
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(8)
1.312***
(0.109)
0.441***
(0.0975)
1.704***
(0.0357)
Y
Y
Y
56,155

Table A.6
INDUSTRY DEFINED LABOR MARKET LEVEL ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LABOR MARKET POWER ON
VIOLATIONS

UR
HHI
Log(H-1Bs)

(1)
0.510***
(0.0684)
1.860
(2.835)
2.584***
(0.307)
N
N
N

(2)
0.939
(0.108)
0.153***
(0.0540)
2.741***
(0.118)
Y
N
N

(3)
0.936
(0.120)
0.218***
(0.107)
2.463***
(0.186)
N
Y
N

(4)
0.780***
(0.0550)
0.248***
(0.0785)
2.955***
(0.105)
N
N
Y

(5)
0.932
(0.0618)
0.677
(0.237)
1.692***
(0.0734)
N
Y
Y

(6)
1.432***
(0.190)
0.188***
(0.0862)
2.779***
(0.128)
Y
Y
N

(7)
0.945
(0.143)
0.286***
(0.0726)
3.052***
(0.0833)
Y
N
Y

Year
Industry
Commuting
Zone
N
54,592
54,592
54,592
54,533
54,533
54,592
54,533
NOTE. UR = Unemployment Rate. This is a negative binomial regression. This model is estimated at the year-labor market level, as
defined by year, industry, and commuting zone. The dependent variable is violations within a labor market and year. Exponentiated
parameter estimates are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. The coefficients are exponentiated
and reflect the change in the rate of violations for a one standard deviation above average increase in the unemployment rate and a
move from a competitive market to a monopsony.
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01. Statistical significance on a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that an individual predictor has no
effect.
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(8)
1.155
(0.142)
0.429***
(0.123)
2.034***
(0.0825)
Y
Y
Y
54,533

Appendix B: Wage and Hour Enforcement of Guest Worker Programs
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor is responsible for
enforcing wage and hour regulations. Most of that enforcement is focused on the Fair Labor
Standard Act (FLSA), and the part that focuses on the regulations of guest worker programs is
somewhat different. A significant change followed a 2010 report to the WHD on “Strategic
Enforcement.” Prior to that report, the WHD’s enforcement work was primarily reactive
(initiated by worker complaints) (Weil 2010).36 The report recommended that the WHD behave
more actively, launching proactive investigations focused on specific industry sectors.37 For H1Bs, for the duration of this study, enforcement has been driven entirely by worker complaints.
Wage theft against guest workers occurs when employers violate their pledge to pay
guest workers and equivalent domestic workers a minimum wage that is the prevailing wage for
a given occupation and location. Guest worker wage and hour enforcement is shaped by statute,
regulations, inter-agency agreements, court decisions, and appropriations bills. For the H-1B
visa, employers must file a Labor Condition Application, an enforceable promise to pay the H1B worker the required prevailing wage in the location and occupation in which the worker(s)
will be employed. This is a statutory requirement (see 20 CFR 655.731). The H-1B Visa Reform
Act of 2004 specifies that the DOL “shall” provide employers at least 4 levels of prevailing wage
“commensurate with experience, education, and the level of supervision.” For each occupation
and geography, there are therefore four effective wage floors set at the 17th percentile (Level 1),
the 34th percentile (Level 2), the 50th percentile (Level 3), and the 67th percentile (Level 4). A
final regulation toward the end of the Trump administration would have increased these wage
floors to the 35th, 62nd, 78th, and 90th percentiles, respectively. As of March 2021, the Biden
administration has delayed implementation of these rules.
For H-1Bs, the WHD “enforces all elements of the LCA” under statutory authority
granted in Subparts H and I of 20 CFR § 655 and as outlined in the WHD Field Operations
Handbook, Chapter 71 (2016). Under the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, the WHD can only
initiate H-1B related investigations with “reasonable cause,” which the Field Operations
Handbook further describes as a result of four factors:

36

From 1998 to 2008, typically more than 75 percent of investigations arose from worker complaints.

37

Since David Weil’s elevation to the position of Wage and Hour administrator in 2014, and following the adoption
of the strategic enforcement agenda articulated in the 2010 report, proactive investigations rose to over half of all
investigations by 2017 (Weil 2018).
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•

A complaint (may be anonymous) is received from an aggrieved party

•

Credible information from a reliable source (a non-complainant) that the
employer failed to meet LCA conditions

•

The Secretary of Labor has found, on a case-by-case basis, that within the last five
years an employer committed willful failure to meet a condition specified in the
LCA. In such cases a random investigation may be conducted.

•

The Secretary of Labor has reasonable cause to believe that the employer is not in
compliance.

Each complaint “must be reviewed and/or screened,” and the WHD is “required by the
[Immigration and Naturalization Act] to issue a formal determination in every investigation
and/or compliance action, and must assess back wages owed workers and other remedies as
appropriate” (Field Operations Handbook, Chapter 71, p. 10). The WHD “lacks authority to
close an investigation and/or compliance action administratively without issuance of a
determination as to whether a violation occurred” (ibid, p. 9). Each complaint must have
occurred within 12 months prior to the receipt of the complaint. Thus, for H-1B workers, the
record is driven by complaints, which are documented. This means that the record is relatively
comprehensive compared to mainstream enforcement efforts in which the WHD can
administratively resolve complaints through a process of conciliation with the employer, without
issuing determinations.
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